ON INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DECISION--

• The book documents for the first time a widespread pre-atomic understanding throughout the government of a "two-step" logic in which the shock of a Russian declaration of war in early August would force Japan to realize the inevitability of defeat--and then a clarification of the terms of surrender, (e.g., assurances for the Emperor) would produce the surrender before an invasion could take place. (See Chapter 9; see the Potsdam Conference Section) It then shows how this option was abandoned once the atomic test proved successful.

• The book also documents the central role of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in the decision. No previous account of the atomic bomb's use has explored the ramifications of Byrnes' dominant influence in similar depth--in large part because Byrnes made sure his tracks were covered as he stepped off of history's stage. (See Chapters 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25; 30; 46)

• Some traditional studies suggest that in one way or another the bombings flowed from momentum--the momentum of war, the momentum of policies inherited from Roosevelt, the momentum of bureaucracy. The book demonstrates that, in fact, the momentum of virtually the entire government with the exception of Byrnes was in precisely the opposite direction--toward ending the war through a clarification of "unconditional surrender." Hence an active "decision" had to be taken--against the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who urged a clarification of terms--and for Secretary Byrnes. (See Chapters 19, 21, 23, 24, 25 and pp. 631 and 633 of the Conclusion. See also pp. 656-663 of the Afterword.)

• In fact three major decisions were made:

  - To delay any statement of intentions to Japan--also against the advice as to timing of Secretaries Grew, Stimson and Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See pp. 60-63, Chapter 4; pp. 247-248, Chapter 19);

  - To eliminate recommended language clarifying the position of the Emperor--against the advice of all the other policy makers involved plus Prime Minister Churchill (See Chapters 23, 24, 25);

  - To delay a Russian attack once the atomic test was successful--against the entire thrust of pre-atomic policy (See Chapter 21).

  In addition, as noted, a decision was made not to follow up on the cables showing Japan's willingness to surrender on the basis of the Atlantic Charter (See Chapters 31, 32)

• At Yalta it had been agreed Russia would be given certain concessions in the Far East (mainly restoration of port access, railroads and small islands lost in the 1905 war.) The U.S. had agreed to arrange, too, for China's agreement. Then the Russians would declare war. (T.V. Soong was the Chinese Foreign Minister.)

• After the atomic test, worried about the diplomatic consequences, the U.S. now tried to stall the Russians--and instead use the bomb. Although the main points had been settled, the "Soong" negotiations were used as a delaying tactic. (See Chapters 8, 9, 13 and 21)

  - Walter Brown's diary records on July 24:

  JFB still hoping for time, believing after that atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby being in a position to press for claims against China. (See p. 268, Chapter 21)

  - On July 28, 1945, Secretary Forrestal reports in his published diary that:

  Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over before the Russians got in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur. Once in there, he felt, it would not be easy to get them out.

  The next sentence, documenting not only Byrnes' general attitude but the specific tactic he used to achieve his goal, is to be found only in the original unpublished diary:

  With all this in mind, he was in favor of Soong's return to Moscow, which he proposes to do, in order to keep the conversation on this subject going. (See p. 275, Chapter 21)

  - On August 5 Truman and Byrnes sent further instructions to Harriman requesting that "no agreement be made involving further concessions by China. . . ." (See p. 414, Chapter 33)

  - In a private 1952 letter from Groves to Byrnes (marked "Confidential" "because I do not feel that any benefit would result if it should become public at this time"):

  You may recall various discussions that I had with you directly and indirectly about my very strong recommendations that we should not tell Mr. Stalin about our anticipated use of the atomic bomb. The reason for this was a desire [sic], which I had every reason to believe you shared, that any such knowledge would make Russia's entry into the war more certain and that we all wanted to avoid. I recall you telling me with considerable relish, after your return, just how the possibility had been broken to Stalin. . . . (See p. 388, Chapter 30)

• The issue of the number of casualties saved by the bomb is also explored in depth in the book. The analysis moves well beyond the conclusion that the commonly cited numbers are highly exaggerated: If, as indicated, there would have been no invasion (because Japan was on the verge of surrender and clarifying the terms and awaiting the Russian's attack appeared likely to end the war) there would have been no invasion casualties at all. If, as seems clear, a clarification of the surrender terms was delayed because of a decision to wait for the bomb, as Secretary Stimson later suggested this may very well have prolonged the war and cost lives. Some 5,000 American lives were lost in the period between Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's late-May proposals for ending the war and the final surrender. (See pp. 466-468, Chapter 38; pp. 518-520, Chapter 42; pp. 633-634, Conclusion) (See also the extended discussion contained in the following endnotes: endnote 44, p. 743; endnote 2, p. 751; endnote 19, p. 752; endnote 17, p. 776; endnote 7, pp. 777-778.)

• Several sections of the book illuminate the relationship of the atomic bomb to diplomacy towards Russia:

  - According to Truman, in one of their very first meetings Byrnes told him that "in his belief the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war." (See p. 134, Chapter 10)

  - The new weapon was first explained to the President because of its role in diplomacy, not because of its role in the war. In late April--in the midst of an explosive confrontation with Stalin over the Polish issue--Secretary of War Stimson urged discussion of the bomb because (as he told Truman) it had "such a bearing on our present foreign relations and . . . such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field. . . ." (See p. 130, Chapter 10)

  - Stimson, for his part, regarded the atomic bomb as what he called the "master card" of diplomacy towards Russia. For this reason, he believed that sparring with the Soviet Union in the early spring, before the weapon was demonstrated, would be counter-productive. After a mid-May meeting on Far Eastern issues Stimson observed that "The questions cut very deep and . . . [were] powerfully connected with our success with S-1 [i.e., the atomic bomb]." Two days later Stimson noted that he

  . . . tried to point out the difficulties which existed and I thought it premature to ask those questions; at least we were not yet in a position to answer them.

  . . . it may be necessary to have it out with Russia on her relations to Manchuria and Port Arthur and various other parts of North China, and also the relations of China to us. Over any such tangled wave of problems the [atomic bomb] secret would be dominant and yet we will not know until after that time probably . . . whether this is a weapon in our hands or not. We think it will be shortly afterwards, but it seems a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in diplomacy without having your master card in your hand. (See pp. 177-178, Chapter 13)

  - Stimson's argument for delaying diplomatic fights with Russia was also noted in another mid-May diary entry describing a conversation with Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy:

  [T]he time now and the method now to deal with Russia was to keep our mouths shut and let our actions speak for words. The Russians will understand them better than anything else. It is a case where we have got to regain the lead and perhaps do it in a pretty rough and realistic way. . . . [T]his was a place where we really held all the cards. I called it a royal straight flush and we mustn't be a fool about the way we play it. They can't get along without our help and industries and we have coming into action a weapon which will be unique. Now the thing is not to get into unnecessary quarrels by talking too much and not to indicate any weakness by talking too much; let our actions speak for themselves. (See pp. 143-144, Chapter 11)

  - After a May 1945 meeting with Truman, Ambassador Joseph E. Davies' diary also records that

  To my surprise, he said he did not want [the heads-of-government meeting] until July. The reason which I could assign was that he had his budget on his hands . . . "But," he said, "I have another reason which I have not told anybody."

  He told me of the atomic bomb. The final test had been set for June, but now had been postponed until July. I was startled, shocked and amazed. (See pp. 147-148, Chapter 11)

  - There is evidence that the broad strategy was probably secretly explained to Ambassador Averell Harriman and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden at this time as well. (See pp. 143-145, Chapter 11)

  - At the end of May Byrnes met at White House request with atomic scientist Leo Szilard. Szilard found that

  Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war. . . . [Mr. Byrnes's view was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe. . . . (See pp. 146-147, Chapter 11)

  - "If it explodes as I think it will", Truman told an associate (indicating the Russians as well as the Japanese), "I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys." (See p. 239, Chapter 19)

  - Scientists in the field, too, got an inkling that there was a strong linkage between the Potsdam meeting with Stalin and the atomic test. Oppenheimer, for instance, later testified: "I don't think there was a time where we worked harder at the speedup than in the period after the German surrender. . . ." (See pp. 148-150, Chapter 11)

  - The timing was perfect: The first successful atomic test occurred on July 16, 1945. Truman sat down for discussions with Joseph Stalin the very next day, July 17, 1945. (See pp. 239-243, Chapter 19)

  - An excerpt from Ambassador Joseph Davies' diary records that at Potsdam:

  [Byrnes] was still having a hard time over Reparations. The details as to the success of the Atomic Bomb, which he had just received, gave him confidence that the Soviets would agree as to these difficulties.

  Byrnes' attitude that the atomic bomb assured ultimate success in negotiations disturbed me . . . I told him the threat wouldn't work, and might do irreparable harm. (See pp. 281-282, Chapter 22)

• Secretary of War Stimson's diary includes this entry regarding Prime Minister Churchill after a full report of the test results was received:
  [Churchill] told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was evidently much fortified by something that had happened and that he stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said, "Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn't understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting." (See p. 260, Chapter 20)

• The diary of Sir Alan Brooke, chief of the Imperial General Staff, includes an entry on July 22, 1945 which provides a description of Churchill's reaction--and further indirect evidence of the atomic bomb's impact on American attitudes:
  [The Prime Minister] had absorbed all the minor American exaggerations and, as a result, was completely carried away. . . . [W]e now had something in our hands which would redress the balance with the Russians. The secret of this explosive and the power to use it would completely alter the diplomatic equilibrium which was adrift since the defeat of Germany. Now we had a new value which redressed our position (pushing out his chin and scowling); now we could say, "If you insist on doing this or that, well . . . And then where are the Russians!" (See p. 260, Chapter 20)

• A systematic analysis of the Potsdam conference is presented in the book. U.S. leaders rested their European diplomacy toward Russia on the assumption the new power of the bomb would soon be shown--and it appears that in some ways thereafter felt almost compelled to use it. (See Chapters 20; 21; pp. 286-287, Chapter 22; and pp. 314-317, Chapter 25; see also pp. 651-652 of Afterword)

• Shortly after Hiroshima Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy met with Byrnes and reported that the secretary of state was
  quite radically opposed to any approach to Stalin whatever. He was on the point of departing for the foreign ministers' meeting and wished to have the implied threat of the bomb in his pocket during the conference. (See p. 429, Chapter 35)

• Stimson himself also had a highly disturbing conversation with Byrnes following a September 4 White House meeting:
  . . . I took up the question which I had been working at with McCloy up in St. Hubert's, namely how to handle Russia with the big bomb. I found that Byrnes was very much against any attempt to cooperate with Russia. His mind is full of his problems with the coming meeting of the foreign ministers and he looks to having the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing he has. (See p. 429, Chapter 35)

  This particular conversation made a lasting impression on Stimson. Byrnes went off to the September meeting of foreign ministers in London, and a few weeks later Stimson's diary again records:

  . . . I was much worried over what Secretary Byrnes had said to me about his coming conference with the Foreign Ministers at which he proposed to keep the bomb, so to speak, in his hip pocket without any suggestion of sharing it with Russia. (See p. 429, Chapter 35)

  [Note: See above, p. 21. Virtually all of the above Stimson diary quotes (and others) on the subject were omitted from his published account.]

• Contrary to conventional wisdom, many of the early critics of the atomic bomb decision were leading conservatives, not liberals.

  - One of the first to express concern was John Foster Dulles, at the time a leading Presbyterian layman and subsequently a 1950s Cold War secretary of state noted for his nuclear "brinkmanship." On August 9, Dulles--together with the president of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, the prominent Methodist bishop G. Bromley Oxnam--appealed directly to Truman to show "restraint" by temporarily suspending "our program of air attack on the Japanese homeland to give the Japanese people an adequate opportunity to react to the new situation. . . ." Such an act, they pleaded, "would be taken everywhere as evidence not of weakness but of moral and physical greatness." (See pp. 437-438, Chapter 36)

  - Henry R. Luce, the publisher of Time and Life, also subsequently recalled his trip to the Pacific a few months before Hiroshima--and observed:

  Two things seemed clear to me--as they did to many of the top fighting men I talked to: first, that Japan was beaten; second, that the Japanese knew it and were every day showing signs of increasing willingness to quit. If, instead of our doctrine of "unconditional surrender," we had all along made our conditions clear, I have little doubt that the war with Japan would have ended soon without the bomb explosion which so jarred the Christian conscience. (See pp. 635-636, Conclusion)

  - Herbert Hoover, who had months earlier tried to persuade Truman to end the war and knew that Japan was essentially defeated, wrote to a friend upon learning of the use of the bomb: "The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." (See p. 635, Conclusion)

• Publications with a conservative editorial policy that were critical of the dropping of the bomb included U.S. News and World Report, Human Events, and The National Review.

  - On August 17, David Lawrence, the conservative owner and editor of the United States News (soon to change its name to U.S. News & World Report) published a strongly worded two-page editorial:

  Military necessity will be our constant cry in answer to criticism, but it will never erase from our minds the simple truth that we, of all civilized nations, though hesitating to use poison gas, did not hesitate to employ the most destructive weapon of all times indiscriminately against men, women and children. (See p. 438, Chapter 36)

  - Similarly, Felix Morley, editor of the conservative Human Events, asked: "If December 7, 1941, is `a day that will live in infamy', what will impartial history say of August 6, 1945?" Morley was particularly disturbed by the "floodgates of official publicity" that followed the Hiroshima bombing:

  Rivers of racy material prepared in our various agencies of Public Enlightenment poured out to the press and radio commentators whose well-understood duty it is to "condition" public opinion. . . .

  Never has any totalitarian propaganda effort fallen more flat. (See p. 439, Chapter 36)

  - A statement defending the bombings by President Truman in March 1958 brought this editorial comment from William F. Buckley's National Review:

  . . . the occasion calls for thoughtfulness, magnaminity [sic], and gallantry. . . .

  . . . [Yet there was] not one word of sympathy (we think of it as Lincoln might have written it) for the survivors of Hiroshima's dead; not one grave word of regret that Hiroshima's dead should have had to die; not one gentle turn of phrase that might suggest to the people of Hiroshima that the man who ordered the bombing suffered, perhaps even prayed, before making the decision, and carries within him a deep sense of its awfulness; and not one ray of recognition of the question that must be at the back of the minds of the people of Hiroshima, and that ought to haunt Harry Truman: "Was it really necessary? Might a mere demonstration of the bomb, followed by an ultimatum, have turned the trick?"

  If there is a satisfactory answer to that question, the people of Hiroshima and the people of the United States have a right to hear it. (See p. 566, Chapter 45)

• In 1946 the official U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that
  certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (p. 520, Chapter 43)

• A recent summary of the expert literature published in the journal Diplomatic History by J. Samuel Walker, the Chief Historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, observes:
  Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan. Experts continue to disagree on some issues, but critical questions have been answered. The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it. (Emphasis added.) (pp. 6-7, Introduction)

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