H-JAPAN (E): Responses to review, Decision to Use A-bomb
Sun, 10 Nov 1996 03:07:24 -0500
(Written by Katie Morris)
H-JAPAN
November 9, 1996
(Editor's note: H-JAPAN continues to post comments on John Bonnett's
review of Gar Alperovitz's _The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb_. The
initial review appeared on this list on September 28. Since this
contribution is quite long, it will be posted in two parts.)
Part I.
I am writing to add my two cents to the ongoing discussion
about the decision to use the atomic bombs, and to comment on the
criticism of Gar Alperovitz and his _The Decision to Use
the Atomic Bomb_ specifically. In the interest of full disclosure,
I should explain that I worked as a researcher/writer/editor on
this study. This fact, will no doubt cause me to be quickly
dismissed as yet another disciple of Gar Alperovitz.
However, I will simply have to accept this and move on, confident
that the points I will make I have come to independently after
thoroughly studying the evidence that bears on the issues at hand.
And for what it is worth, in all the time I have worked with Gar
Alperovitz, never have I felt unable to respectfully disagree
with one point or another.
First, I would like to say that, in general, I have been
disappointed with much of what has been written--disappointed both
by the tone, which has been overwhelmingly angry,
and by the acceptance of attacks on Gar Alperovitz's character and
assumptions about his motives as fine substitutes for thoughtful,
well-argued disagreement with his interpretation.
Perhaps most profoundly, however, I have been disappointed by the
focus of the criticism of the book, which has been almost
exclusively on what it does not do and on the evidence it does not
consider, rather than what it does do and on the evidence it does
consider or, to put this another
way, by the demonstrated unwillingness (inability?) to seriously
engage the evidence and arguments of _The Decision_.
For example, when I first read John Bonnett's initial review
(H-Diplo, Sept. 25), I thought he made an important and worthwhile
point about the significance of perception, and
specifically of the responsibility of the historian to demonstrate
how selected evidence seems to accurately reflect the perceptions
of historical subjects, and therefore is worthy of analysis. It
was because I thought his point important that I was so confused
and disappointed when, in arguing that the evidence in _The
Decision_ more accurately reflects the perceptions of
Alperovitz than those of U.S. leaders in 1945, he did such an
injustice to _The Decision_ by failing to accurately represent the
evidence put forward in the book. Instead, he simply cited
a handful quotations from selected documents, offering no
explanation as to why his selection represented a more accurate
picture than what is cited in _The Decision_. Furthermore, while
criticizing Alperovitz for turning a blind eye toward difficult
evidence, Bonnett and subsequent critics have skillfully avoided
the challenges to their own vision of the way things happened
presented by evidence in _The Decision_.
Equally problematic have been the charges that the argument of
_The Decision_ is necessarily distorted, indeed, necessarily wrong,
because it is not grounded in information from
Japanese sources; and by extension, the implication that U.S.
leaders making decisions in 1945 had access to this information.
The decision to use the atomic bombs was a U.S. policy
decision. It seems fairly straightforward, then, that in analyzing
this decision one must attempt to understand the perceptions of the
U.S. decision-makers through the analysis of evidence which
illuminates what _U.S. leaders perceived was going on in Japan_.
In effect, this means that the evidence will come, necessarily,
mostly from American records. Equally straightforward is the
fact that as most of the informaion in Japanese sources was made
available only after the war, it does not pertian to analysis of
the U.S. decision specifically but rather, to an entirely different
(if equally important/interesting) line of inquiry, namely,
whether, given what we know now, the bombings were necessary for
ending the war when it ended. If the latter were the focus of
_The Decision_, those who criticize the absence of attention to
Japanese sources would be justified. (Similarly, if it were a
military history study of the objective necessity of the use of
atomic bombs, based on lessons we have learned since the war, the
charge that the evidence in _The Decision_ is flawed because it
does not take such lessons into consideration would also be
justified.(1)) However, _The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb_ is,
quite explicitly, a study of a 1945 U.S. policy decision and the
context in which this decision was made or, what U.S.
decision-makers knew and when. In researching and writing this
study, therefore, we were interested in uncovering not what Tokyo
wanted, but what Washington thought Tokyo wanted,
as revealed by 1945 briefing papers, intelligence studies, strategy
papers, cable transcripts, meeting minutes, office records, diaries
and personal correspondence.
I should stress that I in no way mean to diminish the
contributions of historians who have studied Japanese sources--I
believe this work is essential, and have personally learned much
from it. Nor do I mean to argue that Japan should be left out of
bomb discussions in general. My point is simply that anyone who
compares the information in American and Japanese sources will
see that American leaders had only limited insight into the
internal dynamics of the Japanese cabinet debates in general, and
Hirohito's role in particular; and it pertains to arguments like
that put forward on October 10, by Eric Bergerud:
Alperovitz greatly simplifies and twists the vital issue of
the Showa Emperor's position in postwar Japan. Although Alperovitz
would like his readers to believe that Tokyo wanted nothing more
from Washington than assurances that Hirohito could continue on as
a kind of Japanese King Albert, the truth was quite different.
There is little reason to believe that the Japanese government
feared the complete destruction of the Imperial throne....Indeed,
anyone examining the debates that went on within the Japanese
government after Tojo's fall in July 1944 is struck by the fact
that Tokyo was not fighting for Hirohito as an individual, but for
the nationalist-Shinto political structure that the Emperor
symbolized....
While this may be true, the fact is that U.S. leaders did not have
access to information detailing
the debates that went on within the Japanese government after
Tojo's fall in July 1944. Indeed, the evidence reveals that U.S.
leaders who looked into this issue believed the emperor's status
was the condition on which Japanese surrender debates turned, and
that assuring the Japanese they could keep the emperor was well
within U.S. war aims, and that once they secured a
surrender, they could re-define Hirohito's role as necessary. Also,
however naive or misguided it may seem today given what we know
from Japanese sources, as a result of what they read in
July and August MAGIC intercepts, many members of Truman's
administration came to believe that assurances might hold the key
to changing the recognition of the inevitability of complete
defeat into surrender, or, at the very least, given the stakes,
that it was worth a try. To understand this however, it is
necessary to actually look carefully at the evidence of U.S.
perceptions, something which the critics who have written thus far
have apparently not done.
In fact, the discussion and criticism have only confirmed my
suspicion that the majority of people writing about the decision to
use the atomic bombs remain in the dark about the
content of so much of the available record, and that Chip Young's
assumption that we are looking at the same body of materials, while
logical, is mistaken. And while the tone especially
makes me think it a bit futile to talk about evidence, it seems
important to at least try to clarify
a few points. Thus, in an attempt to advance the discussion, I
will present some of the important evidence which has been
overlooked but without which I think it impossible to
understand the evidence and the judgments put forward in _The
Decision_. In an effort to make this manageable, I have divided my
response in two parts.
Let me begin by following Bergerud's suggestion to "look very
closely" at the Combined Intelligence Committee's (CIC) "Estimate
of the Enemy Situation" of July 8, 1945 (CCS 643/3).
This document has been cited to illustrate two separate
points--one, that U.S. military leaders
judged that Japan was held up not just on the status of the emperor
but also on the question of occupation; and the other, that U.S.
military leaders did not believe that Soviet entry into the
war would have a decisive effect on the Japanese war effort.
Unfortunately, in citing this estimate, both Bonnett and Bergerud
not only took quotations out of the context of this one
document, but also, in doing so, failed to deal with any of the
evidence that documents how the conclusions put forward in this
document, prepared for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, were
evaluated by the U.S. and British Chiefs. This is unfortunate,
because a review of this evidence, as well as the evidence
illuminating the context in which it was written, reveals much
more about the perceptions of U.S. military leaders than the
document itself, not to mention isolated quotations.
To begin with, the minutes of the July 16 Combined Chiefs
meeting reveal that their discussion of CCS 643/3 focussed on "the
last sentence on page 10 of the paper _where the
survival of the institution of the emperor was mentioned_."
(Unfortunately, both Bonnett and Bergerud elected to leave this
particular sentence out of their reviews. For those of you who
have read only their reviews, the whole sentence reads: "To avoid
these conditions, if possible, and, in any event, to insure
survival of the institution of the Emperor, the Japanese might well
be willing to withdraw from all the territory they have seized on
the Asiatic continent and in the southern Pacific, and even to
agree to the independence of Korea and to the practical
disarmament of the military forces."(2)) Judging from the record
of this discussion, it seems that the military chiefs interpreted
this sentence to mean that the status of the emperor was the
critical issue. Speaking for the British Chiefs, Sir Alan Brooke
initiated discussion, suggesting that
there might be some advantage in trying to explain this term
["unconditional surrender"] to the Japanese in a manner which would
ensure that the war was not unduly prolonged in outlying areas.
If, for instance, an interpretation could be found and communicated
to the Japanese which did not involve the dissolution of the
Imperial institution, the Emperor would be in a position to order
the cease-fire in outlying areas whereas, if the dynasty were
destroyed, the outlying garrisons might continue to fight for many
months.
If an interpretation on these lines could be found an
opportune moment to make it clear to the Japanese might be shortly
after a Russian entry into the war.
Then, after some discussion, the American Chiefs suggested that "it
would be very useful if the Prime Minister [Churchill] put forward
to the President [Truman] his views and suggestions as
to how the term 'unconditional surrender' might be explained to the
Japanese."(3) And when General Sir Hastings Ismay, chief of staff
to the minister of defence, passed the American
request on to Churchill, he did so in a report on this meeting, in
which he described their discussion, and CCS 643/3, in the
following terms:
The Combined Chiefs of Staff at their first meeting had under
consideration a paper prepared by the Combined Intelligence Staffs
on the enemy situation, in which it was suggested that if and when
Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would
probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the
dethronement of the Emperor.(4)
To be perfectly clear, the Combined Intelligence Staffs estimate,
however "conditional" it may seem today, was interpreted by the
U.S. and British chiefs to indicate that from the military
perspective, removing threats to the emperor was critical because
surrender could not be hoped for so long as the Japanese perceived
the emperor to be threatened, and surrender could not be
achieved without the emperor. Also, Ismay's point that "if and
when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would
probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the
dethronement of the Emperor," suggests that the Combined Chiefs
interpreted the CIC to be saying that, in fact, Soviet entry would
be decisive.
That said, those who have looked at the CIC estimate are right
at least in noting that it conveys a lack of certainty. It is with
their explanation of this uncertainty that I take exception.
I would argue that the lack of definitiveness is due not to
uncertainty about the importance of clarifying unconditional
surrender, especially with regard to the emperor's status, or about
the psychological impact that Soviet entry would have, but is due
to uncertainty about (and lack of control over) the direction that
policy would take. To understand this, however, one needs a
little background:
In April 1945 the U.S. approached success in its efforts to
totally cut off Japanese troop reinforcements from the Chinese
mainland, troops which originally would have been held back
by Soviet troops when they entered the war. Almost simultaneously,
intelligence intercepts revealed a Japan increasingly desperate to
keep the Soviet Union neutral. This led U.S. military
planners and intelligence officers to reassess the role that the
Soviet Union was expected to play.
As it is explained in _The Decision_, intelligence studies from as
early as April 1945 reveal that they began to value Soviet entry as
much for its potential psychological impact as for its
potential military impact. These studies also document that as the
psychological dimension of the war was investigated, the
unconditional surrender problem came into sharp relief.
For instance, on April 6, 1945, the Joint Intelligence
Committee (the same body that helped prepare CCS 643) was asked to
give their opinion on two questions:
a. At what stage of the war will the Japanese realize the
inevitability of absolute defeat?
b. Will such realization result in their unconditional
surrender, passive submission without surrender, or continuing
resistance until subdued by force?(5)
The JIC answers, which were reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on April 29, helped set the terms of strategy and planning of the
last months of the war. Note just a few things:
Under the heading "Japanese ealization of the inevitability of
absolute defeat," they wrote:
The Japanese will realize that absolute defeat is inevitable
when they perceive that their armed forces are incapable of
arresting the progressive destruction of their basic economy. The
increasing effects of air-sea blockade, the progressive and
cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, and the
collapse of Germany (with its implications regarding redeployment)
would make this realization widespread within the year. The entry
of the U.S.S.R. into the war would, together with the foregoing
factors, convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of
complete defeat.
Under "Possibility of surrender following japanese realization
of inevitability of defeat," they wrote:
Although individual Japanese willingly sacrifice themselves in
the service of the nation, we believe that the nation as a whole is
not pre-disposed toward national suicide....The actual implications
of unconditional surrender, however, are unknown to the Japanese.
In this uncertainty, they are and will remain unprepared for
either surrender or passive submission without formal unconditional
surrender. If, however, the Japanese people, as well as their
leaders, were persuaded both that absolute defeat was inevitable
and that unconditional surrender did not imply national
annihilation, surrender might follow fairly quickly. Otherwise, it
is probable that resistance will continue until subdued by
force....(6)
There are two ways of understanding this evidence. One, the
JIC was saying that Soviet
entry into the war, coming when Japan had been feeling the effects
of blockade and bombardment, will convince Japan of the
inevitability of defeat but, because securing unconditional
surrender is necessary, force (i.e., invasion) will be required.
Or two, the JIC was saying that unconditional surrender is
unnecessarily vague, and that defining unconditional
surrender is entirely within the realm of possibility (if not
within their power), and if it could be defined, i.e., terms could
be outlined, doing so in combination with Soviet entry (i.e., the
combination of these two steps) might produce a surrender "fairly
quickly"; but, so long as unconditional surrender in all its
vagueness is insisted upon, even if the shock of Soviet entry
were to convince "most Japanese of the inevitability of complete
defeat," force (invasion) will probably be necessary. I believe
they were arguing the latter, and that strategic planning from
here on in reflects the tension between recognizing the problem and
lacking the authority to determine policy, therefore having to
assume the "what ifs" about clarifying "unconditional
surrender" an Soviet entry would remain "what ifs" and continue to
plan for the worst.
For example, consider the statements made by Army Chief of
Staff George Marshall in an exchange of memoranda in late May-early
June 1945. On June 9, Marshall wrote:
it would seem better that we take action to discourage public
use of the term "unconditional surrender," which we all agree is
difficult to define, and encourage instead more definitive public
statements concerning our policy and war aims. We should cease
talking about unconditional surrender of Japan and begin to define
our true objective in terms of defeat and disarmament....
His conclusion, "The nature of the objective, whether phrased as
'complete defeat' or 'unconditional surrender,' is going to be
determined by the detailed instructions, and the suppression of the
statement 'unconditional surrender' will have little practical
effect on the final result," only confirms that Marshall believed
what was important were the terms, the war aims,
and that these needed to be spelled out.(7) Whether or not they
did so while keeping the "unconditional surrender" rhetoric, really
did not make a difference. In fact, the resulting
directive issued from Marshall to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
indicates Marshall's insistence that "we should be careful not so
to crystalize the phraseology "unconditional surrender" as to
preclude the possibility of changing this terminology to something
which might be psychologically more conducive to the earliest
defeat of Japan."(8)
Yet, while these statements confirm that Marshall understood
the problem of unconditional surrender, other evidence confirms
that he also understood that so long as unconditional surrender
remained unclarified, there was a strong chance that the war would
go on and he and the Joint Chiefs were responsible for planning for
this. For example, consider the evidence from June 18, 1945 which
suggests that, even at that early date, the presiding
officer of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Leahy urged the president not
to insist upon unconditional surrender because he feared that "our
insistence on unconditional surrender would result only
in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty
lists." "He did not think this was at all necessary," the minutes
of the June 18 meeting note, and, in fact, his diary entry from
that day reveals that this was because at that time he believed "a
surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted
by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory
provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific
aggression."(9) Perhaps this has been quoted so many times it has
lost its punch: here, in the privacy of his own diary, the
presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of
Staff to the President is writing that as of June 18 he perceives
the situation to be one in which a surrender could be achieved
which would satisfy the war aims of the United States and still be
accepted by Japan. Whether or not he was right is a separate issue,
and should be handled as such. The point here is that this
evidence reflects his perception of the situation. And further,
that as the president did not at this time opt to clarify
"unconditional surrender," the documentary record reflects
continued planning for the invasion.
Also consider the Joint Chiefs' independent efforts to get
Truman to clarify unconditional surrender with regard to the status
of the emperor. After attempting to approach the subject
through Churchill, they touched on the issue of the emperor's
status again during their meetings on July 17 and 18, this time in
the context of a discussion of a draft of what became the
Potsdam Proclamation. On the 17th, they considered an opinion
paper presented by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), in which
the JSSC approved the draft, but cautioned that the sentence which was
intended to clarify "unconditional surrender" with respect to the
emperor, could possibly, as written, backfire. This group
suggested alternative language which the JCS adopted because they
feared that threatening the emperor, even inadvertently in poorly-
worded assurances, could mean a longer war.
This has been interpreted to mean that the Joint Chiefs, and
General George Marshall in particular, were against offering any
assurances at all. I refer specifically to Bergerud's October
28 assertion that "at the time of Potsdam the JCS and Marshall did
NOT favor Grew's mention of the Emperor's status in the Potsdam
Declaration. Marshall, like Cordell Hull, favored the
retention of the Emperor but feared the consequences of making it
a PUBLIC issue prior to surrender or a realistic appeal by the
Japanese government to the UNITED STATES..."
[emphasis Bergerud's] Simply, this does not square with the
evidence: During the meeting, the minutes note, Marshall approved
the language suggested by the JSSC, because he recognized
the need for using the emperor in achieving surrender. In fact, he
stressed that President Truman be advised that nothing should be
done "to indicate that the Emperor might be removed
from office upon unconditional surrender." Thus, in a memorandum
to Truman the Chiefs recommended _not_ removing a clarifying
sentence all together, but that instead of telling the
Japanese they could have a "constitutional monarchy," it would be
better to echo the neutral language of the Atlantic Charter, and
assure the Japanese that "Subject to suitable guarantees
against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be
free to choose their own form of government."(10) (Both this and
the civilians' formulation were rejected and the Proclamation
was issued without any clarification at all on this issue. This,
Mr. Bergerud, is the "unrealized 'flex'" in the diplomatic
situation in mid-1945.(11) And this also illuminates the Combined
Intelligence Committee's lack of definitiveness: They had even less
power than the JCS, and while on one level they could recommend
clarification, on another they had to assume there
would be no change.
Likewise, with Soviet entry, while the evidence indicates
military leaders understood its potential decisiveness, they also
had to assume that it might not happen, and more, because of
the widely recognized risks involved in inviting the Soviets into
the war, they were reluctant to push this option unless it were
deemed absolutely necessary. Consider Marshall's comments at
the June 18 White House strategy session. At Truman's request,
Marshall addressed the role that the Soviet Union might play.
Reading from a paper prepared by his planning staff, he
explained that if a surrender were to occur prior to complete
military defeat, it would be because Japan was faced by the
"completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already
wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a
landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and
also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of
Russia into the war."(12) This awkwardly-worded statement has lead
several historians and analysts to conclude that Marshall
considered the effect of Soviet entry to be entirely contingent
on a landing--a judgment which, though understandable, is probably
not correct. First, note Marshall's comments, a little later in
the meeting, when he re-emphasized the potential
significance of Soviet entry:
An important point about Russian participation in the war is
the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may
well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that
time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.(14)
Here, not only was Marshall not saying that the effect of Soviet
entry was contingent on a landing, but, in fact, he left open the
possibility that Soviet entry might make a landing
unnecessary: "or shortly thereafter _if_ we land in Japan."
Second, not more than a few weeks before, Harry Hopkins had
confidently reported from Moscow Stalin's commitment to enter the
Pacific war around August 8--almost three months before the
November 1 landing would occur-- therefore "at that time" could,
simply, not coincide with the landing.(13) Third, as noted, war
department thinking at this point was that the effect of Soviet
entry combined with the "increasing effects of air-sea blockade,
the progressive and cumulative devastation wrought by
strategic bombing, and the collapse of Germany (with its
implications regarding redeployment)"-- no mention of the
invasion--would "convince most Japanese at once of the
inevitability of defeat."
If anything, the strange wording of Marshall's comments
reflects the fact that they were prepared for and presented at a
meeting during which the Joint Chiefs were trying to convince
Truman that he had to prepare for the worst, and that planning for
the invasion--something everyone dreaded--had go forward. Given
this objective, it is highly unlikely that they would
have then gotten his hopes up that Soviet entry alone might
convince the Japanese of the inevitability of their defeat. Added
to this is, again, the fact that regardless of how much U.S.
military leaders valued Soviet entry, because of the political and
diplomatic risks involved, none were willing to go on record as
pushing Truman in this direction.(15)
(Even still, in closing the meeting, Truman stated "that one
of his objectives in connection with the coming conference [at
Potsdam] would be to get from Russia all the
assistance in the war that was possible."(16) And, when he finally
received Stalin's commitment to enter the war, he wrote "I've
gotten what I came for--Stalin goes to war August 15 with no
strings on it."(17) Also, in his 1955 memoirs, at a time when he
might have been tempted to downplay any interest he had had in
securing Soviet entry into the war, he explained that his
"immediate purpose [in going to Potsdam] was to get the Russians
into the war against Japan as soon as possible" and that securing
Soviet entry had been a priority for him because "If the
test [of the atomic bomb] should fail, then it would be even more
important to us to bring about a surrender before we had to make a
physical conquest of Japan."(18))
Furthermore, because of concerns which effectively limited
what was said and what was recorded, Marshall's comments illustrate
one of many instances when looking beyond the
obvious, easily accessed record is useful. For example, on July
10, 1945, in a private letter--not a public statement and certainly
not an official position taken at White House meeting with the
President to explain strategy--Marshall's top planner General
George Lincoln (who had a hand in preparing Marshall's June 18
comments) candidly expressed his judgment on the status of the
war:
The B-29's are doing such a swell job that some people think
the Japs will quit without an invasion. This may be so providing
we can get an adequate formula defining unconditional surrender.
That we have attempted to do, and it has gone from this group
through channels to the President. My personal opinion, which
isn't much, is that there are two psychological days in this war;
that is, the day after we persuade Russia to enter,
if we can, and the day after we get what the Japs recognize as
a secure beachhead in Japan. Around either of those times we might
get a capitulation, providing we have an adequate definition of
what capitulation means.(19)
This judgment is so consistent with the rest of the evidence from
the war department that it cannot be overlooked. Moreover, it
illumintates the other more "official" evidence, including
the CIC estimate. This bears on Bonnett's charge that Alperovitz
mischaracterized the CIC study when he wrote that "The Combined
Intelligence Committee had concluded--again, even
before news of the Emperor's move was received--that the
combination of a Russian attack and
a change of terms appeared likely to end the fighting." To
substantiate this claim, Bonnett chose to emphasize one
quotation--"A conditional surrender by the Japanese government
along the lines stated above might be offered by them at any time
from now until the time of the complete destruction of all Japanese
power of resistance"--ignoring the quotation on which deals
specifically with Soviet entry--"An entry of the Soviet Union into
the war would finally convince the Japanese of the inevitability of
complete defeat." Without this quotation it does, perhaps,
seem to be overstatement. However, Alperovitz's claim was not only
based on this particular quotation, but also on the evidence
above--including Ismay's summary and the evidence
documenting the evolution of the understanding which is reflected
in Lincoln's "personal opinion." Unfortunately Bonnett noted none
of this.
In closing this first segment of my comments, I would like to
make one further point about the criticism of _The Decision_,
drawing on the evidence laid out above. In his initial
review, John Bonnett faulted _The Decision_ for misrepresenting the
views of U.S. leaders on the effect that Soviet entry would have on
the progress of the war. He claimed that, in fact,
U.S. leaders "remained oblivious to the potential psychological
impact Soviet entry would have," and looks not to contemporaneous
evidence, but only to a footnote in an article by Barton
Bernstein to substantiate this claim. This is unfortunate on
several levels, but mostly because as much as I respect the
contribution that Barton Bernstein has made to A-bomb scholarship,
the observation put forward in this footnote--that "After rereading
key diaries and related papers for the 24 July-10 August 1945
period, I have been surprised by how little focused attention the
issue of Soviet entry received for its psychological effect, as
distinguished from its military value, in contributing to Japan's
future defeat"--is not his finest.(20) Indeed, although it was
Bernstein who was one of the first to argue, rightly, that bomb
historians needed to look back to even before Truman became
president in order to properly contextualize the bomb decision,
here, he makes the mistake of looking to the period _after_ the
news of the success of the atomic test was received for focus on
Soviet entry for its psychological value. If only Bonnett had
looked carefully at Bernstein's article, _The Decision_ or,
probably best, the relevant evidence, he would have seen that it is
a bit of a mystery why it should come as a surprise that there is
little evidence of focused attention on the psychological value of
Soviet entry during this particular July 24-August 10 period. As
even Bernstein himself has noted, once the bomb had
been successfully tested on July 16, U.S. decision-makers not only
were not focusing on the shock value of a Russian attack, they had
lost interest in Soviet entry completely and, in fact,
were actively attempting to keep the Russians from entering the
war.(21) Added to this was the ever-present sensitivity to the
political/diplomatic risks posed by Soviet entry, and resulting
reluctance to be seen as the one who pushed Soviet entry. No, as
the above evidence should make clear, for evidence of U.S. leaders'
understanding of the psychological value of Soviet
entry one must look back (and look carefully) to April, May, June
and early July 1945, when the atomic bomb was, in Stimson's
post-war words, "a weak reed" on which to rely, and all
possible strategic options had to be explored.
Endnotes for Part I
(1) Bonnett, H-Diplo, 10 Oct. 1996.
(2) CCS 643/3 "Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July),"
July 8, 1945, p. 10. National Archives, Washington, DC, R.G. 218,
"CCS 381 (6-4-43), Sec. 2, Part 5." (Alperovitz, _The
Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb_" [New York, 1995], p. 227.)
(3) FRUS, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), Vol. II, pp. 36-7. (_The
Decision_, pp. 245-46.)
(4) John Ehrman, _Grand Strategy_, (London, 1956), p. 291. (_The
Decision_, p. 246.)
(5). Memorandum for Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Subject: Unconditional Surrender of Japan, April 6, 1945. National
Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 218, JCS
Geographic Files, 1942-45, "CCS 387 Japan (4-6-45)," Box 655,
"Unconditional Surrender of Japan." (_The Decision_, p. 113)
(6) JCS Info Memo 390, 29 April 1945, "Unconditional Surrender of
Japan," Enclosure:
"Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee." National Archives,
Washington, D.C., Record Group 218, JCS Geographic Files, 1942-45,
"CCS 387 Japan (4-6-45)," Box 655, "Unconditional Surrender of
Japan." (_The Decision_, pp. 113-14.)
(7) Memorandum for the Secretary of War, from Marshall, June 9,
1945. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 165, Entry
421, Box 504, "ABC 337 Japan (11 Jan 45), Sec 1-A." (_The
Decision_, p. 55.)
(8) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Decision Amending J.C.S. 1366, 14 June
1945. National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 165, Entry
421, Box 504, "ABC 337 Japan (11 Jan 45), Sec 1-A." (_The
Decision_, p. 56.)
(9) Meeting minutes: U.S. Department of Defense, _The Entry of the
Soviet Union into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941-1945_
(Washington, D.C., 1955), p. 84. Diary: Leahy
Diary, June 18, 1945, Library of Congress Manuscripts and Archives
Division, Washington,
D.C. (_The Decision_, pp. 324, 65.)
(10) For the minutes of the July 17 meeting see, FRUS, Potsdam
Conference, Vol. II, pp. 39-40. For the memorandum to the
president, see ibid, pp. 1268-69. (_The Decision_, pp. 299-
300.) Here, it may worthwhile noting that they recommended this
language be added to paragraph 12 of the draft, which clarified the
U.S. position on occupation: "The occupying forces of the Allies
shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are
accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a
peacefully inclined, responsible government of
a character representative of the Japanese people," and yet never
seem to have seen a particular problem with this point. Perhaps it
is because the Joint Chiefs believed this was a place where
the U.S. had to be firm. However, perhaps it also means that they
did not see occupation as anywhere near the problem that the
emperor's status was.
(11) Bergerud, H-Diplo, 10 Oct. 1996.
(12) U.S. Department of Defense, _The Entry of the Soviet Union
into the War Against Japan_, p. 78. (_The Decision_, pp. 122-23.)
(13) U.S. Department of Defense, _The Entry of the Soviet Union
into the War Against Japan_, pp. 72-3. (_The Decision_, pp.
120-21.)
(14) ibid, p. 79. (_The Decision, p. 123.)
(15) Clues like the following from an April 4, 1945 memorandum by
Vice Admiral Cooke afford a glimpse of what cannot be known:
In making an outline of the factors bearing on our strategy
against JAPAN, I have not included very much about RUSSIA. In this
there are so many political aspects that it seems better for them
not be be [sic] included in a Joint Chiefs of Staff paper, but,
nevertheless, they should be borne in mind in any oral
conversations with the President.
Memorandum for Adm. King, April 4, 1945, Hoover Institute Archives,
Stanford, CA, Cooke Papers, Box 24, "Lockup." (_The Decision_, p.
97.)
(16) U.S. Department of Defense, _The Entry of the Soviet Union
into the War Against Japan_, p. 84.
(17) Harry S Truman, _Dear Bess: The Letters From Harry to Bess
Truman, 1910-1959_, ed. Robert Ferrell, (New York, 1983), p. 519.
(_The Decision_, p. 242.)
(18) Harry S Truman, _Year of Decisions_, Volume I, pp. 322-23 and
p. 417. (_The Decision_, p. 124.)
(19) Lincoln to Wedemeyer, July 10, 1945, U.S. Military Academy
Library, West Point, NY, Lincoln Papers, Box 5, Wedemeyer Folder.
(_The Decision_, pp. 359-60.)
20. Bonnett, H-Diplo, September 25, 1996. Barton Bernstein,
"Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed
Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern
Memory," _Diplomatic History_, 19:2 (Spring 1995), p. 247, n. 67.
21. See _The Decision_, pp. 266-75. See Bernstein's "Understanding
the Bomb," pp. 246-47, where he characterizes it as an "impeding"
strategy.